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Some types of ﬁrst-person narrations of mental processes that constitute phenomeno-
logical accounts and texts, such as internal monolog statements, epitomize the best
expressions and representations of human consciousness available and therefore may be
used to model phenomenological streams of consciousness. The type of autonomous
monolog in which an author or narrator declares actual mental processes in a think
aloud manner seems particularly suitable for modeling streams of consciousness. A
narrative method to extract and depict conscious processes, operations, contents, and
states from an acceptable phenomenological text would require three subsequent steps:
operational criteria for producing and/or selecting a phenomenological text, a system
for detecting text items that are indicative of conscious contents and processes, and a
procedure for representing such items in formal dynamic system devices such as Petri
nets. The requirements and restrictions of each of these steps are presented, analyzed,
and applied to phenomenological texts in the following manner: (1) the relevance of
introspective language and narrative analyses to consciousness research and the idea
that speciﬁc narratives are of paramount interest for such investigation is justiﬁed; (2)
some of the obstacles and constraints to attain plausible consciousness inferences from
narrative texts and the methodological requirements to extract and depict items relevant
to consciousness contents and operations from a suitable phenomenological text are
examined; (3) a preliminary exercise of the proposed method is used to analyze and chart
a classical interior monolog excerpted from James Joyce’s Ulysses, a masterpiece of the
stream-of-consciousness literary technique and, ﬁnally, (4) an inter-subjective evaluation
for inter-observer agreement of mental attributions of another phenomenological text
(an excerpt from the Intimate Journal of Miguel de Unamuno) is presented using some
mathematical tools.
Keywords: narrative method, consciousness research, interior monolog, phenomenological texts, conscious
process models, dynamic system model, heterophenomenology, neurophenomenology
“Let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which
they fall, let us trace the pattern, however, discontinued and incoherent
in appearance, with which each sight or incident scores upon the con-
sciousness.”
Woolf (1925; The Common Reader)
INTRODUCTION: SUBJECTIVE NARRATIVES AND
CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
A fundamentalmethodological assumptionof neurophenomenol-
ogy is that subjective verbal reports expressed by people about
what goes on in their minds is a critical and necessary source
to understand conscious processing and its neural and other
bodily correlates (Varela, 1996). Moreover, such reports may be
construed as to provide a pragmatic evidence of the embod-
ied character of mental life in terms of its neurobehavioral,
sensorimotor, expressive, communicative, and enactive nature.
The phenomenological approach to analyze other people’s con-
sciousness was extensively employed after the 1920s by European
psychiatrists of the stature of Karl Jaspers, Joseph Minkowski, or
Ludwig Binswanger, in their attempt to apply the guidelines of
Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s methods in their every-
day clinical practice and their understanding of mental illness
(Broome et al., 2013). The application consisted in obtaining, ana-
lyzing, and interpreting descriptions of the conscious experiences
uttered by patients in order to evaluate them as symptoms of a
deﬁned or alleged mental disease or syndrome. Such an approach
constituted innovative and substantial progress in the exploration
of other people’s experience and in the development of a sys-
tematic mental examination, even though the material of the
verbal reports and other expressions of the patients were consid-
ered primarily to detect and categorize mental symptoms (Taylor,
1967). The present-day neurophenomenological approach would
employ the phenomenological method to the meticulous analy-
sis of verbal reports without a primary psychopathology stance
to evaluate any conscious experience. The epistemological req-
uisite would be to treat such verbal expressions as raw data in
a sense not very dissimilar to that of videotape recordings of
behavior for quantitative ethology and other behavioral sciences
requiring further and systematic analyses in order to represent
such manifestations in manageable and meaningful transcrip-
tions and models (Díaz, 2007).1 The present work proceeds from
1If I understand them correctly, this is what Varela and Shear (1999) mean by
mediated verbal reports.
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these considerations in order to explore the possibility of a care-
ful and systematic narrative analysis of ﬁrst-person subjective
reports as indicators of the structure and dynamics of human
consciousness.
From a phenomenological standpoint, consciousness can be
regarded as a cinematic or narrative stream of explicit mental
events. The word consciousness is used here as being analogous to
awareness: the acts and processes of an individual while experienc-
ing mental events such as perceiving, feeling, thinking, believing,
imagining, remembering, desiring, intending, attending, manip-
ulating, acting, and the like. A scientiﬁc analysis of consciousness
crucially depends upon empirical methods to analyze such mental
phenomena and processing. Since we do not have a direct con-
sciousnessmeterwemust continue to rely uponﬁrst-person verbal
reports, the traditional manner to access conscious mental acts by
the ﬁrst-person recount and expression of introspection andby the
third-person reception and interpretation of such recounts. After
the surge, banning, and rebirth of introspective methods during
the 20th century, it has been said that verbal reports obtained
in controlled conditions and subjected to inter-subjective analyses
constitute the best tools to study conscious processes and a plau-
sible form of neomentalism (Paivio, 1975). Although they can be
challenged on several theoretical grounds and there is considerable
room for improvement, introspective ﬁrst-person reports can be
so treated as to yield trans-subjective data conforming to standard
rules of the prevalent scientiﬁc method (Díaz, 2007). Moreover,
well-structured ﬁrst-person reports can be used not only as raw
data to carry out experiments relevant to neurophenomenology
and cognitive neuroscience, but can also be important sources
of data for modeling the dynamic structure of consciousness. In
order to test such a proposal, it would be necessary to simul-
taneously work out the discursive forms of suitable ﬁrst-person
reports, a system for transcribing them into phenomenological
texts, and techniques to extract from such texts dynamic dia-
grams and models. Indeed, a narrative approach in consciousness
research requires the breakdown of boundaries among cognitive,
neural, literary, and philosophical disciplines in order to provide
a structured, plausible, and empirically testable explanation of
narratives in relation to conscious states and processes (Fireman
et al., 2003). A wide ﬁeld of narrative inquiry emerging in the
social sciences already provides theoretical and technical tools in
the analysis of discourses and texts (Bloom et al., 1994; Andrews
et al., 2008).
In this paper, I will advance some considerations, proposals,
and analyses leading to a narrative method for the study of ﬁrst-
person reports as expressions of conscious processes.2 The general
objective of this method is to generate criteria for the produc-
tion, selection, and transcription of texts that describe subjective
experiences and to develop a method of analysis that allows for
their interpretation and representation in terms of the structure
and dynamics of consciousness, altogether an essential require-
ment of a systematic neurophenomenology platform. Two main
hypotheses of the program are (1) that certain types of narrative
that may be called phenomenological texts constitute a privileged
expression of conscious experience, and (2) that a dynamic-system
2The Narrative method for consciousness research, or Name-core.
narrative approach to these expressions allows for the analy-
sis and modeling of the contents and dynamics of conscious
processes.
In order to accomplish the task, this paper is divided in sections
proceeding from a general picture of ﬁrst-person narratives to
an analysis and plotting of two relevant texts in the shape of a
dynamic-system portrayal of mental processing. Thus, in the ﬁrst
section the relevance of introspective language and narratological
analyses to consciousness research is explored, and the idea that
some narratives are of paramount interest for such investigation
is justiﬁed. Some of the obstacles to attain plausible conscious-
ness inferences from narrative texts are examined in the second
section, and several constraints are described. The most impor-
tant constraint is the assertion that only a few types of narratives,
such as interior monologs, thinking aloud procedures, and some
other subjective-state testimonies and discourses, can be used with
this aim. The third section examines the methodological require-
ments of a procedure designed to extract and depict items relevant
to consciousness contents and operations from a suitable phe-
nomenological text. In the fourth section a preliminary exercise
of the proposed method is used to analyze and chart an excerpt
of James Joyce’s Ulysses a classic example of the “stream of con-
sciousness” literary technique. Finally, a treatment and evaluation
of another phenomenological text, an excerpt from the Intimate
Journal of Unamuno (1970) using some inter-observer agreement
mathematical tools is presented.
STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS, HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY,
AND LITERARY CRITICISM
In chapter 4 of his well-known book Consciousness Explained,
the philosopher of mind Dennett (1991) put forward the idea
of heterophenomenology, a program of consciousness research
consisting of the extraction and transcription of ﬁrst-person
accounts and their interpretation as a ﬁctional narrative text by
trained observers. The heuristic promise of heterophenomenol-
ogy would take the protocol analysis (Ericsson and Simon, 1984)
and empirical phenomenology (Klein andWestcott, 1994) methods
a step further in the direction of modeling consciousness pro-
cesses and dynamics. In fact, the claims of heterophenomenology
have been extended, in both ﬁrst- and third-person perspec-
tives, to legitimize the inferences of animal consciousness by the
concurrent use of physiological, cognitive, and behavioral data
(Radner, 1994).
Another way of exploring the promise of heterophenomenol-
ogy would be to treat introspective verbal reports not merely as
ﬁctions of a sort,3 but as possible genuine renditions, since their
narration is an ancient and efﬁcient instrument for recognizing
and evaluating actual mental states in others indicating that such
narrations communicate several aspects of the formand content of
the conscious processes that produced and/or correspond to them.
It is by examining diverse types of introspective texts and develop-
ing the tools to attain plausible representations and interpretations
of these verbal reports in terms of the structure and dynam-
ics of consciousness that the heterophenomenology promise may
be put to the test. Not only the human capacity to introspect
3Pace Dennett (1991, p. 81).
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conscious experience (Goldman, 2006) and the reportability of
mental processes are indicators of conscious processing (Cohen
and Schooler, 1997), but the second and third-person ability to
recognize and interpret consciousness states or intentions in the
speaker or writer (Hirsh, 1967; Gibbs, 1999) are fundamental tools
in interpersonal communication traditionally employed in daily
life, in literature, or in the clinical practice of medical semiology,
psychopathology, and psychotherapy. The use of autobiographi-
cal or soliloquy texts, such as diaries, chronicles, and descriptions
or simulations of experience produced by either accomplished
or naive writers and speakers, would be a particularly favorable
approach (Díaz et al., 1998). This idea has precedents in literary
theory and criticism (Cohn, 1978; Pimentel, 2012) some of which
may be used to specify the linguistic characteristics of ﬁrst-person
introspective accounts, which in turn may be used to generate
approaches that enrich our understanding of the structure of
consciousness.
One of the precedents that may be invoked is the venture of
French philosopher Bachelard (1982) to study the dynamics of
imagination as a basic form of consciousness through the analy-
sis of an immense amount of literary images. His approach was
that of a phenomenologist who partakes in the experience of the
mental image (Vigneault, 1984). Another relevant case is that of
the literary discipline of narratology, the formal study of narra-
tive genres, systematics of narrative, and structure of the story
(Ryan and Alphen, 1993). Some contemporary trends in narra-
tology are of cognitive interest because they have developed with
the general framework of Chomsky’s linguistics and generative
grammars. For example, narrative grammars attempting to cap-
ture cognitive processes have been integrated into the semantics
of narrative action (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Philosophers
of the stature of Ricoeur (1985) have also raised the converse
issue of the cognitive value of narrative structures. In this con-
text, the Geneva School of phenomenological literary critics have
tried to describe and reconstruct the precise ways in which the
world is given to the consciousness of both reader and writer
through the agency of a narrative (Poulet, 1970). A cognitive
approximation to ﬁrst-person narratives attempts to understand
the nature of consciousness by the analysis of oral or writ-
ten productions of natural language (Chafe, 1990, 1994). From
these ideas we may adopt and justify the emphasis of addressing
conscious experience as depicted in the text and suspend con-
siderations of cultural, biographical, or historical inﬂuences. The
narrativemethodof inquiry should be restricted to the literary lan-
guage that arguably is the fabric of the writer’s phenomenological
consciousness.
It is of course important to realize that consciousness is promi-
nent in all narrative. In fact, it is a speciﬁc feature of narrative
that the realistic presentation of consciousness of a ﬁctional char-
acter can create the illusion of immediacy; that is, the illusion
of direct insight into the character’s mental life (Stanzel, 1984, p.
126). The presentation of internal experience in a novel is con-
nected with the narrative mode and with perspective, the choice of
point of view or standpoint from which a story is narrated. Such
fundamental features of ﬁctional narrative are also true for sub-
jective experience, ordinarily endowed with an intentional stance
and a point of view. A selection of information and reduction
of data are also characteristic features of both consciousness and
literary narration. The process in a narrative may be at the same
time an account of behavioral actions or historical events and a
description of the role mental processes of a character play in
the generation of those actions and the impact they have upon
the character’s inner world. From such a dual setting of nar-
rative, the noted cognitive psychologist Bruner (1986) derives
the proposal of two types of thinking, one paradigmatic, deal-
ing with physical reality, truth, action, and external observation,
and the other narrative, having to do with mental experience and
with the intentionality of mental processes. Moreover, authors
of narratives need to draw from folk psychological paradigm sce-
narios to describe how certain states of consciousness, especially
emotions, are elicited. For Oatley and Jenkins (1992), such sce-
narios are widely prevalent as plot or script units (schemata) that
are also used in the autobiographical narratives uttered in psy-
chotherapy and constitute a core of the concept of personality.
After a careful analysis of the structure and meaning of narra-
tive texts, the sociologist of language Chafe (1990) concludes that
narratives provide evidence for the nature of the mind and are
important vehicles for mental research and the understanding of
consciousness.
Although all works of ﬁction have a background of implicit
consciousness that takes shape in a reader’s experience (Valdés,
1982, p. 41), the modern novel also seeks to depict consciousness
explicitly in the foreground text. Thus, in direct response to Henri
Bergson and William James, a post-symbolist literary trend called
“stream of consciousness” developed in England and France dur-
ing the dawn of the 20th century. The movement included some
works byWoolf (1925/2012, whowrote its credo: see epigram) and
especially Ulysses by James Joyce and Marcel Proust’sA la recherche
du temps perdu, two ground-breaking pillars of the modern novel.
Also in William Faulkner’s novels, especially in As I Lay Dying, a
series of stream-of-consciousness monologs appear without the
presence of a narrator. This technique turns the psychology of a
character into a dominant concern and is able to present it with
much more complexity and authority than the more traditional
narrative styles. According to Pope and Singer (1978), this literary
trend had lasting consequences for other forms of artistic expres-
sion, including the innovative ﬁlms of Russian director Sergei M.
Eisenstein.
In reference to the possibility that these types of texts may be
taken as actual descriptions of consciousness, it is necessary to
caution that nothing is further from the stream-of-consciousness
ﬁction than direct or automatic writing of what comes to the mind
of the author. In fact, except for a thinking aloud or autonomous
monolog mode of expression, it would seem quite impossible
for writers to keep up with the stream of their own conscious-
ness and its multimodal verbal and non-verbal phenomenological
content so as to faithfully capture it in ongoing words. Actually,
stream-of-consciousness texts are extremely careful and controlled
productions of what an author envisages as taking place in the
conscious and subconscious mind of a ﬁctional character. Accord-
ingly, the resulting literary piece is produced by a narrator of an
invented and therefore simulated consciousness (Steinberg, 1958).
To be sure, in order to be able to invent what goes on in the
mind of a character authors need to examine the workings of their
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own mind, to infer the workings of other people’s minds, and
in this way to develop and use an implicit “theory” of mind and
consciousness.
The modern novel introduced early last century with the mas-
terpieces of James Joyce and Marcel Proust constitutes the most
skillfully crafted resemblance of human consciousness available.
This can be asserted for several reasons: the implicit theory of
mind and consciousness used by each author, the process of con-
sciousness as the author’s principal subject, the extraordinary
literary devices used, and the reader translation of the simile
into an awareness of a recognizable state of mind are some of
the reasons to assert such resemblance. Because of similar delib-
erations, Ricoeur (1985) considered that no art has gone as far
as the novel in the representation of consciousness and pro-
posed that its developed diversity and ﬂexibility have made it a
privileged instrument for the investigation of the human psy-
che. M. M. Bakhtín, another prominent literary scholar of last
century, claimed that the novel represents the best example of
the dialogic character of consciousness with its representation
of alterity (Radzikhovskii, 1987). Moreover, according to Bel-
gian literary critic Poulet (1970), consciousness is the point at
which author and reader converge because the characteristic con-
dition of narratives is that readers summon back a literary work
by placing their consciousness at its disposal. Furthermore, the
noted novelist and philosopher Murdoch (1992, pp. 258–264)
claims that the novel exhibits the ubiquity of the truth-seeking
and value-laden moral quality inherent in consciousness. Among
many others, she offers the powerful example of the consum-
mate moment towards the end of Proust’s classic A la recherche
du temps perdu when the narrator experiences a pure state of joy
and certainty after stepping and slipping on an uneven paving
stone.
A potentially fruitful possibility is to try to infer and analyze
the theory of consciousness used by writers to simulate the men-
tal states of their characters, a theory that most likely explains
their behavior or further cognition. The existence of a system
of causal law-like explanations would imply a narrative psychol-
ogy, a developed variety of folk psychology quite worth exploring.
Such narratological analysis would be a signiﬁcant step, provided
that it succeeds in showing the structure of consciousness accord-
ing to a given author. Ascertaining whether an author’s model is
correct would be a separate issue initially requiring comparisons
with other authors and cognitive science models. Such a narrative
research into consciousness structure is strengthened by several
broad proposals emerging since the 1990s. Thus, a “marriage”
between narratology and cognitive science was proposed in 1994
by Nobel laureate Simon (Simon, 1994), at the same time that
qualitative methods of discourse analysis started to develop (Den-
zing and Lincoln, 1994), and an interdisciplinary ﬁeld of narrative
psychology was projected (Hevern, 1997).
From this concise review of a disperse but vigorous research
endeavor, it is possible to conclude that over the decades a num-
ber of literary critics and narratologists have developed an erudite
and reﬁned inquiry of consciousness expression in texts that is
of potential value to the cognitive neuroscience of conscious-
ness. Despite the usual and required academic controversies in
the ﬁeld, their attempt has been logically rigorous and for the
most part germane and comprehensible. A true interaction or
even an inter-discipline between criticism and neuroscience seems
probable if an inclusive method to explore consciousness that
takes into account both its verbal phenomenological expression
and neurobiological aspects is purposefully designed and devel-
oped. An ultimate objective of this program would be not only to
provide a rigorous method to detect and evaluate consciousness
contents in phenomenological texts, but to use this technique to
correlate with brain images in a genuine neurophenomenological
approach.
THE INTERIOR OR AUTONOMOUS MONOLOG: A SUITABLE
INTROSPECTIVE REPORT
The possibility of inferring the structure of consciousness through
the analysis of ﬁction raises several thorny problems concerning
the relationships between literary techniques and actual stream
of consciousness features. To begin with, it is necessary to rein-
force that we should concentrate on the manifest rather than the
latent content of a text because it is the process and the phe-
nomenology of consciousness what is of interest for modeling
streams of consciousness. The latent environmental, historical,
cultural, or psychoanalytic components—though they are cer-
tainly present in all works of ﬁction and strongly engage the
reader’s consciousness—can only be approached from a different
stance; for example, that of a hermeneutic interpretation (Valdés,
1982; Ricoeur, 1985). But even if we agree to concentrate on the
manifest textual description, in order to take a literary work as an
indicator of the operations of consciousness, we would need to
surmount a triple barrier because the author makes up a con-
sciousness and fashions it into a literary form that the reader
eventually experiences as an invented consciousness in a trans-
subjective form. The questions of (1) how an author imagines a
ﬂow of consciousness, (2) how he or she manages to simulate and
express the verbal and non-verbal subjective processes, and (3)
how to extract any consistent information about consciousness
through the analysis of ﬁction would need to be carefully sorted
out.
Some literary critics (Humphrey, 1954; Steinberg, 1958) have
noted that in order to produce an illusion of uncontrolled nar-
rative ﬂow, the author has recourse not only with words but also
with verbal and punctuated disguises of sensations, perceptions,
and images of different levels of abstraction. Perhaps such prag-
matic means could be systematically deﬁned in order to help
encode general consciousness contents. As for the phenomeno-
logical engagement of reader and text, it is possible to conceive
standard inter-evaluator agreement procedures for encoding and
transcribing the text that would render it more objective (in the
sense of being inter-subjectively calibrated). I will return to this
after dealing with the ﬁrst two barriers.
In her exhaustive analysis of consciousness modes of pre-
sentation, narrative mediation, and point of view in literature,
Harvard’s literary critic Cohn (1978) showed that consciousness
may be presented in a text in either third- or ﬁrst-person contexts.4
In third-person texts, consciousness may be described in three
4Pimentel (2012, pp. 117–177) provides an extensive analysis, commentary, and
literary examples of Cohn’s categories.
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main ways: (1) psycho-narration, narration of what a character
is thinking or feeling, (2) quoted interior monolog, direct thought
quotation, and (3) narrated monolog, a character’s mental dis-
course in the guise of the narrator’s discourse. In ﬁrst-person texts,
consciousness may be described in similar ways: (1) self-narration,
retrospective description of amental state, (2) self-quoted monolog,
quotations of past thoughts, and (3) self-narrated monolog, when
the narrator identiﬁes with his or her past self.
Cohn further distinguishes such ﬁrst-person narratives from
the autonomous monolog, in which the thoughts of the narrator
unfold at the moment of locution. This is a variety of present tense
discourse previously called direct interior monolog and soliloquy
(Dujardin, 1931/1991; Humphrey, 1954). In this type of discourse
narrators describe their actual moods, opinions, memories, and
mental circumstances through many literary devices and the pre-
vailing use of the pronoun I. In the interior monolog text the I
abdicates its function of explaining, ordering, selecting, and pre-
senting the elements of the story to the reader, in favor of the direct
rendition of the mental processes of the narrator’s or the charac-
ter’s mind. This is in sharp contrast to the autobiographical novel
with its characteristic ﬁrst-person explanatory narration. The nar-
rating self of the monolog has been substituted by an experiencing
self that does not address a reader but embodies a consciousness
process in a particular situation (Stanzel, 1984, p. 174). In this
way the readers are obliged to place themselves in the character’s
position and to experience his or her mind directly in the act of
reading. The paradigmatic example used by Cohn to illustrate
the autonomous monolog is in “Penelope,” the closing chapter of
James Joyce’sUlysses,“the onlymoment in thenovelwhere a ﬁgural
voice totally obliterates the authorial narrative voice throughout an
entire chapter”(Cohn, 1978, p. 218). As we shall see in a forthcom-
ing section, it is possible to identify verbal renditions of emotions,
memories, projects, visual and auditory impressions, or voluntary
movements by dividing selected excerpts of this text in syntac-
tic units of meaning and by identifying speciﬁc expressive forms
and patterns. An interesting variant of the autonomous monolog
is the memory monolog in which a remembered episode plays a
privileged role in the present discourse and takes the form of an
autobiographical narrative in which the chronological structure
of the episode corresponds to the live present of the autonomous
monolog so that the string of memories springs up in the monolo-
gist’s mind at the moment of locution (Cohn, 1978, pp. 247–250).
Clearly, the literary form of the autonomous monolog can accom-
modate a surprisingly wide variety of mental experiences and,
according to Cohn, in ways which afﬁliate it closely to the “lyric
present”of some forms of poetry and drama. Cinema also presents
such monologs at times in intense and dramatic renditions. A
paradigmatic example of this is Tom’s (played by Henry Fonda)
monolog or soliloquy from The Grapes of Wrath (Directed by John
Ford in 1941):
Well,maybe it’s like Casy says. A fella ain’t got a soul of his own, just a little
piece of a big soul—the one big soul that belongs to everybody. Then...
then, it don’t matter. I’ll be all around in the dark. I’ll be ever’ where—
wherever you can look. Wherever there’s a ﬁght so hungry people can
eat, I’ll be there. Wherever there’s a cop beatin’ up a guy, I’ll be there. I’ll
be in the way guys yell when they’re mad—I’ll be in the way kids laugh
when they’re hungry an’ they know supper’s ready. An’ when the people
are eatin’ the stuff they raise, and livin’ in the houses they build—I’ll be
there, too.
It seems possible to pose that some thinking aloud (Ericsson
and Simon, 1984) and other ﬁrst-person reports of introspection
(e.g., Pope and Singer, 1978, pp. 288–297) used in the cogni-
tive sciences could also be considered narratives in the form of
the autonomous monolog. Through successfully bypassing the
simulation barrier, these instances can be more readily used to
model the structure and operations of consciousness. In order to
bypass the simulation barrier, the writer or speaker talk directly
from his or her awareness mainly by canceling the intentional
stance of communicating to a listener or reader what happens in
their mind. Thus, by resorting to a more primitive or prelogical
mode of thought (Hogenraad and Orianne, 1983), the monologist
makes a more emphatic claim to accuracy than if she had used
other techniques to depict consciousness. If this inference is cor-
rect, and if it is true that these types of narratives retain more
veritable traces of experience than others, they can be considered
actual data for cognitive neuroscience and neurophenomenology.
It seems therefore worthwhile exploring the linguistic and non-
linguistic structure and variations of the autonomous or interior
monolog and its close relatives in drama and cinema (which add
the concurrent domain of non-verbal behavior), as possible forms
of expression and analyses of consciousness processes. Given the
formidable obstacles of simulation, this literary form could be
paramount in a narrative approach to consciousness. Moreover,
verbatim recordings and transcriptions of monologs, soliloquies,
and other introspective reports produced in medical, psychiatric,
and psychotherapeutic settings that intent to directly and accu-
rately express the process and contents of the speakers mental life
may constitute the most direct expressions of conscious processes
and therefore amenable to cognitive exploration and modeling.
Following the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the Canadian
Education Scholar van Manen (1990) posed that to conduct a
ﬁrst-person narrative or report of an experience is to give a direct
description of an ongoing or past experience without trying to
embellish, explain, or interpret it.
Even if direct, sincere and forthright descriptions of experi-
ence are obtained, it is important to emphasize again that these
expressions should not be understood as mimetic or mechani-
cal reproductions of consciousness comparable, for example, to
videotapes of behavior as realistic renditions of movements or
actions. The monolog would be more comparable to the anecdotal
verbal descriptions of behavior that evolved to categorize, identify,
sample, and schematize behavior and from which advanced etho-
logical models of behavior have been drawn (Ray and Delprato,
1989).
A NARRATIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF CONSCIOUS
PROCESSES FROM PHENOMENOLOGICAL TEXTS
The modeling of consciousness processes from verbal reports
carefully produced and obtained according to the rules of the
autonomous monolog or thinking aloud techniques, requires the
development of a threefold narrative method focusing on the pro-
duction and analysis of what has been called a phenomenological
text (Díaz et al., 1998). The ﬁrst part of the procedure requires
standardized criteria for selecting and/or obtaining a pertinent
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 739 | 5
“fnhum-07-00739” — 2013/11/7 — 21:42 — page 6 — #6
Díaz Narrative method for consciousness research
experience descriptive monolog or a phenomenological text. A
phenomenological text is a ﬁrst-person verbal report that describes
states of consciousness by expressing ongoing conscious experi-
ence in the present time, that is, in the act of speaking or writing.
Phenomenological texts include ﬁction narratives, which are sim-
ulated ﬁrst-person texts, the mimetic soliloquies, and interior
monologs of the “stream of consciousness” literature, and ana-
lytic texts or psychological narratives such as Proust’s prose in
A la Recherche du temps perdu. Phenomenological texts can also
be non-ﬁction factual, candid, and bold ﬁrst-person texts found
in autobiographies, journal excerpts, and psychopharmacology
self-experiments. Other types of non-ﬁctional phenomenologi-
cal texts are transcriptions of introspective accounts such as the
factual ﬁrst-person soliloquies stated in medical and psychother-
apy sessions and transcribed in verbatim protocols (Bucci, 1996;
Mergenthaler, 1996). A qualitative discourse analysis approach to
the verbatim transcriptions in the analytic hour is becoming a
motivating research tool to investigate a psychoanalytic process
(Siegel et al., 2002). There is, of course, ample room to gener-
ate and reﬁne syntactic, pragmatic, and connotation rules for the
development of methodical phenomenological texts starting from
the stream of consciousness or thinking aloud techniques. More-
over, with continuing practice and correction according to an ever
more reﬁned set of rules, human subjects could become expert
“monologists” in the production of rich and ever more rigorous
phenomenological texts.
The second part of the narrative method requires the develop-
ment of a system that allows for the identiﬁcation of items in the
phenomenological text that are taken to be indicative of speciﬁc
consciousness contents and processes. This possibility rests on the
argumentation made by Reader’s Response critic Iser (1978)5 that,
despite the fact that a literary text leads to a wide variety of sub-
jective experiences in the reader, it also contains inter-subjective
veriﬁable instructions for meaning production. In the case of cog-
nitive science, Ericsson and Simon (1984) have led the way with
their analysis of verbal protocols, which is based on a precise cod-
iﬁcation of a list of actions explicitly deﬁned and consistently
applied through linguistic processing. In their case the task is
more manageable because they usually deal with speciﬁc assign-
ments such as problem solving. The prospect of generating a list
of mental categories that would be involved in task-independent
situations may appear to be staggering and as impossible to attain
as a complete ethogram or inventory of behavioral units of a given
animal species. Condensed or restricted lists of general mental
categories (such as sensation, emotion, thought, image, recall, inten-
tion) would be necessary requirements for embarking on such
an inquiry. There are methods for analyzing content in verbal
samples that can reliably measure some mental and emotional
traits that are, in turn, well deﬁned and categorized through
the application of standardized classiﬁcation codes and scales
(Gottschalk, 1995).
This narrative method proposes to code phenomenological
texts by hand, rather than by computer, even though there are
computerized text analysis methods such as linguistic inquiry and
word count (LIWC), DICTION, General Inquirer, Differential
5Derived from John Searle’s speech–act theory.
Language Analysis, and several kinds of sentiment analyses that
allow to quickly and reliably detect features of what people say
and some subtleties in their linguistic styles. There seems to be
of psychological value the detection of particles of speech that
include pronouns, articles, prepositions, conjunctives, and auxil-
iary verbswhich serve asmarkers of emotional state, social identity,
and cognitive styles (Pennebaker et al., 2003). In this way, Natural
Language Processing has been an active computational research
enterprise and recently it has assumed the challenge to detect,
analyze, and classify subjective private states, particularly senti-
ments or emotions under the label of Affective Computing. Even
though the objective has largely been focused on opinions, senti-
ments, and attitudes expressed in social networks as relevant for
decision-making processes inmarketing andbusiness, their poten-
tial application on basic search of consciousness traces in written
texts is foreseeable if the obstacles are solved. Montoyo et al. (2012)
critically reviewed the ﬁeld and it is possible to surmise that is
rapidly advancing in several directions, but that there remain
formidable challenges to meet. In reference to the need to detect
and analyze phenomenological texts by hand it seems relevant to
mention the following three obstacles of the computational meth-
ods in Subjectivity and Sentiment Analysis: (1) to detect speciﬁc
subjective items and connotations, specially in languages other
than English, (2) to interpret the cultural or intentional context of
bothwriter and reader of a given text, and (3) to detect not only the
explicit but the implicit expressions of sentiments and many other
mental states. For example, the available methods are effective in
detecting the polarity orientation of emotional opinions concern-
ing a commercial item or a human personality, but the detection
of speciﬁc emotions is more difﬁcult except if the names of these
emotions are openly depicted in the text, Thus, the main reason to
code by hand is that understanding and assessing segments of texts
allows for a psychological attribution, scope, accuracy, and depth
that still cannot be matched by computerized language measures
that are probabilistic methods of word detection, count and use.
Even though the results suggests that Affective Computing meth-
ods can identify some emotions in written texts, word use is highly
contextual and the systems ignore setting, style, irony, sarcasm,
meaning, or intent that are paramount features of consciousness
and decisive to recognize a person’s state of mind (Tausczik and
Pennebaker, 2010). Nevertheless it seems feasible and probably
useful to use both computer-based and reader-interpretation sys-
tems to increase the reliable detection of speciﬁc mental items in
phenomenological texts.
An analysis of a phenomenological text would require an
inter-subjective agreement and calibration among independent
evaluators decoding of a text in accord with a set of oper-
ational deﬁnitions and rules. Such an approach would not
attempt or dare to reduce the phenomenon of literature, narra-
tive, or discourse into a discriminating technical procedure, but
would consider and use one of its forms, a well-deﬁned phe-
nomenological text, as a linguistic channel for the expression
and analysis of conscious experience. The procedure seems more
modest and practical than some methods used in literary criti-
cism, such as the phenomenological approach of Valdés (1982)
based on textual analysis and inter-subjective (reader–author)
interpretation.
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Finally, the method would require a procedure for transcribing
the coded items into formal devices such as dynamic system dia-
grams. There has been a growing interest in the development of
formal methods for the analysis of narrative texts, some of which
seem suitable for the purpose of encoding and transcribing lit-
erary, spontaneous, and/or methodical phenomenological texts.
Thus, the narrative method of Abell (1993) formalized a ﬁnite
set of actors, actions, and outcomes in an algebra of sequences
that are laboriously translated into a “kinematics” graph. Wildgen
(1994) proposed a realistic dynamic system analysis of meaning in
narrative texts based on an extensive linguistic and mathematical
framework that applies image and process schemata to construct
pictorial representations. To obtain a graphic representation, nar-
ratives are broken into units or episodes, and the information in
each one is depicted by vectors representing the function of the
main verb of the unit in the two dimensions of text progression
and referential content. The aim of the method is to “uncover the
metamorphosis of ‘reality’ and lived experience without loosing
the volatile traces of experience” (Wildgen, 1994, p. 155, empha-
sis added). These procedures enable the narrativist to piece the
elements of actions together as parts of a meaningful structure
that, in turn, invites interpretation. Nevertheless, the resulting
graphical representations are frequently quite abstract and difﬁ-
cult to interpret without extensive information about the coding
and transcription criteria.
Since the 1990s I suggested that other dynamic system tech-
niques, such as Petri nets, can be used and may be more intuitively
accessible (Díaz, 1997, 2007). Petri nets are important compu-
tational models used for the analysis of information processing
systems that consist of the explicit graphic representations of the
dynamics of a concurrent dynamic system (Peterson, 1981). In
Petri nets the process is usually presented by the use of nodes
(places and transitions) connected by arcs in which tokens are
ﬁred from one place to the next in the transition. Petri nets have
been used in the representation of actions (Adorni and Poggi,
1991) that may be relevant to the task of depicting the informa-
tion coded from a phenomenological text. In 1996 I used an open
Petri net diagram to model conscious streams that represented
the rising of contents (sensations, emotions, thoughts, images) as
nodes or places, the processing as arcs or vectors, and their effects
as transitions (arrow tips) in a temporal graph of mental states
unfolding from left to right (Díaz, 1996). Such a representation
was speciﬁcally intended to incorporate elements of phenomeno-
logical texts and thereby to model some of the dynamic elements
of conscious processes.
The remaining sections of this paper will present two phe-
nomenological texts selected because they fulﬁll the requirements
posed. The two texts are used to apply a procedure of identiﬁ-
cation of speciﬁc conscious contents and processes and, in the
ﬁrst case, to also transcribe the coded items to a Petri net type of
graph.
MOLLY BLOOM’S MONOLOG: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL TEXT
ENCODED AS A DYNAMIC SYSTEM
A brief excerpt from “Penelope” in Ulysses, previously analyzed
by Cohn (1978, pp. 223–225) as an example of autonomous
monolog, will be now used to perform a preliminary test of
the procedure. Cohn divided the chosen fragment into 30 seg-
ments or sentences that are listed below. The words in parenthesis
show a tentative encoding of every sentence in linguistic terms
and/or possible corresponding states of consciousness in bold
characters.
1. I bet the cat itself is better off than us (Conjecture) (irrita-
tion)
2. Have we too much blood up in us or what (Rhetorical
question) (irritation)
3. O patience above is pouring out of me like the sea (Interjec-
tion) (despair)
4. Anyhow he didn’t make me pregnant as big as he is (Empha-
sis) (contempt)
5. I don’t want to ruin the clean sheets (Reﬂection) (sensa-
tion, wish)
6. The clean linen I wore brought it on too (Reﬂection)
(recollection, image)
7. Damn it damn it (Interjection) (anger)
8. And they always want to see a stain on the bed to know youre
a virgin for them (Reﬂection) (image irritation)
9. All that’s troubling them (Same reﬂection) (irritation)
10. they’re such fools too (Same reﬂection) (contempt)
11. You could be a widow and divorced 40 times over (Exagger-
ation) (irritation)
12. A daub of red ink would do or blackberry juice (Fantasy)
(image)
13. No that’s too purply (Correction) (unfolding image)
14. O Jamesy let me up out of this (Interjection) (tiredness,
anxiety)
15. Pooh (Interjection) (same)
16. Sweets on sin (Interjection) (same)
17. Whoever suggested that business for women what between
clothes and cooking and children (Rhetorical question)
(thought)
18. This damned old bed too jingling like the dickens (Judg-
ment) (recollection, sensation)
19. I suppose they could hear us away over the other side of the
park till I suggested to put the quilt on the ﬂoor with the pillow
under my bottom (Reﬂection) (recollection, image)
20. I wonder is it nicer in the day (Question) (thought begins)
21. I think it is (Answer) (thought progress)
22. Easy (Adjective) (thought ends)
23. I think I’ll cut all this hair off me there scalding me (Plans)
(sensation, fantasy)
24. I might look like a young girl (Judgment) (fantasy devel-
oping)
25. Wouldn’t he get the great sucking the next time he turned up
my clothes on me (Rhetorical question) (fantasy)
26. I’d give anything to see his face (Judgment) (fantasy ends,
wish)
27. where’s the chamber gone (Question) (visual image)
28. Easy (Adjective) (reassurance)
29. I’ve a holy horror of its breaking under me after that old
commode (Judgment) (fear, fantasy)
30. I wonder was I too heavy sitting on his knee (Question)
(fear, recollection)
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This is an excellent example of the type of autonomous
monolog that strongly suggests states of consciousness from sensa-
tions, perceptions, emotions, recollections, conjectures, fantasies,
or purposes and their unfolding. We are under the vivid impres-
sion of overhearing a thinking and feeling mind. Note that
the expression of conscious processes is conveyed by the expert
monologist not only by the meaning of the words chosen, but by
linguistic signals detectable as interjections, exclamations, rhetor-
ical questions, or self-referential sentences even in this text devoid
of punctuation. Thus, although at some level of analysis the writ-
ten text must be correlated with ongoing thought, it expresses
a much fuller range of consciousness contents than merely
thought.
The inference I havemade of speciﬁcmental states from the dis-
cursive and textual elements is tentative and preliminary. In order
to codify phenomenological texts more strictly, it would be neces-
sary to secure a list of operationally deﬁned discrete mental states
and to submit selected texts to inter observer comparison and strict
agreement procedures as will be presented in the next section. In
reference to the emotions there has been substantial advance to
provide for an encoding technique. Such progress includes a deﬁ-
nition of the loci of affect in language (Besnier, 1990), a semantics
of emotional word concepts (Wierzbicka, 1992), the emotional
value ascribed towords (Campos andGonzález, 1992), and a chro-
matic model of the affective system developed from the clustering
of emotional terms (Díaz and Flores, 2001).
Figure 1 shows a graph produced following some of the afore-
mentioned Petri net model features of consciousness structure.
The encoding of Joyce’s phenomenological text analyzed above
is charted in two dimensions. The horizontal dimension of time
is plotted in accord with the advance of the text in which each
segment or sentence is given an arbitrary unitary value. More rig-
orous temporal criteria could be followed such as the number of
letters or words or reading aloud time. But we must consider that
the relationships among physical time, clock time, subjective time,
discourse time, and diegetic or narrative time is very complex
and, indeed, in many ways bafﬂing (Ricoeur, 1985; McInerney,
1991; Díaz, 2011). Four general mental categories are plotted as
nodes and vectors in the vertical dimension: (1) sensations and
perceptions, (2) emotions, (3) thoughts (including recollections,
plans), and (4) mental images (including fantasies). When two
simultaneous contents are recognized in a given segment, a ver-
tical line signiﬁes their binding into a single state. Finally, when
the linguistic ﬂow and meaning suggest that one mental state is
crucially involved in the generation of the next one, such apparent
mental causality is depicted by arrow tips located at the end of
a vector.
In Figure 1, the mental process of the ﬁctional Molly Bloom
expressed in the text, can be carefully reconstructed and analyzed
in terms of its microstructure dynamics. For example, the pro-
cess can be segmented into the seven micro-episodes shown in the
upper line according to apparent breaks in the causality ﬂow (seg-
ments 1–4, 5–13, 14–16, 17, 18–22, 23–26, and 27–30). Each of
these segments has a particular subtheme or content process that
can be detected in the text. Such particular mental processes can
be as short as single items, such as the relatively isolated thought in
17 or emotion in 14–16. They can also appear as a complex amal-
gam of ensuing multimodal factors and states usually triggered
by a sensation and developing around the particular theme (the
“stain”sequence 5–13; the“jingling”sequence 18–22; the“cut hair”
sequence 23–26; and the “chamber-commode” sequence 27–30).
Moreover, the particular themes seem to integrate a larger subject
FIGURE 1 | Flow diagram of linguistic items signaling mental processes
encoded from an excerpt of James Joyce’s Ulysses.The phenomenological
text is divided in 30 sentence segments (Cohn, 1978, pp. 223–225) and these
are plotted as arbitrary units in the temporal dimension of the abscissa. The
ordinate shows four general categories of mental contents inferred (see text)
from each segment (S, sensations; E, emotions; T, thoughts; I, mental
images). Following some rules of Petri nets computational devices (Peterson,
1981) applied in a dynamic process model of consciousness (Díaz, 2007),
individual contents detected in each segment are depicted as places (O),
information processing as arcs (−), and mental causality as arrows (→).
Simultaneous mental tokens detected in a single episode are connected by
vertical lines to indicate their binding in a single mental state or occasion.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 739 | 8
“fnhum-07-00739” — 2013/11/7 — 21:42 — page 9 — #9
Díaz Narrative method for consciousness research
that can be identiﬁed in terms of Molly Bloom’s attitudes, his-
tory, and personality. The interpretation of these factors would go
beyond the task of detecting the microstructure of a consciousness
stream. Nevertheless, even in this brief encounter with Molly’s ﬁc-
tional mind we can ratify Steinberg’s notion (1958, p. 232) that we
are in the presence of “a shallow mind working over the mulch of
everyday existence.”
It is my contention that this model probably depicts parts of the
theory of consciousness used by the author in the fabrication of
the subjective world of a ﬁctional character. It would be of interest
to compare it to other dynamic encoding of phenomenological
texts, such as “thinking aloud” transcriptions, journals, dramatic
soliloquy, or “lyric present” poems. Such comparison could be
indicative of the value of the procedure to model the dynamic
structure of consciousness.
UNAMUNO’S JOURNAL EXCERPT: AN INTER-SUBJECTIVE
ATTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
The inter-subjective analysis of a phenomenological text is another
empirical avenue to test the hypothesis of the present research pro-
posal and protocol. The ability of research participants to evaluate
an introspective journal excerpt in two different tasks was assessed
by inter-observer agreement methods. The ﬁrst task was the divi-
sion of a selected phenomenological text in thematic segments; the
second, the attribution of speciﬁcmental category terms to the rec-
ognized segments. Sixteen students from the Faculty of Psychology
from the University of Querétaro, México, were used as an assem-
bly of judges. They were handed an excerpt from Intimate Journal
by the well-known Spanish philosopher Unamuno (1970)6 and
instructed to break the text according to the expression of distinct
ideas, not necessarily following grammar or punctuation follow-
ing the deﬁnition of a text segment as a chunk of text that is
perceived as a unit. The deﬁned segments appear below with the
index of the average inter observer agreement on the right. Since
the total average inter observer agreement was 0.60 and this rep-
resented a percentage above half of the participant judges, it was
decided that any agreement above this level would be signiﬁcant
and serve to establish a segment for further analysis. The aster-
isk following the index signiﬁes that a partition was established
so that, in this way, the text was divided into the following nine
segments enlisted below with their English translation below each
segment.
6The original text in Spanish followed by my translation into English:
“Elmás insigniﬁcante suceso, el encuentro de cualquier frase, la palabramás inocente
que oiga, lo que dice mi hijo, todo se me antoja aviso y símbolo y cosa de sentido
oculto, todo lo traduzco a mi estado. Si sigo así voy á caer en superstición. No
suenan una vez las campanas que no crea que me llaman; se me antoja que se me
ha de dirigir á preguntarme que me pasa cualquier religioso que veo. Un deseo
grande de declarar mi estado á todos, una gran felicidad de hacer confesiones a
cualquiera, y una enorme sequedad é indiferencia si pienso en hacerla como la Iglesia
manda.”
“The most insigniﬁcant occurrence, any sentence I encounter, the most innocent
word I hear, whatever my son says, everything seems to me a signal, a symbol and a
matter of hidden meaning, I translate everything to my state. If I continue like this,
I will fall into superstition. Not a single bell tolls that I fail to believe is calling me,
I fancy that every man of the cloth that I pass will approach to inquire what is the
matter with me. A great desire to declare my state to all, a great happiness to make
confessions to anyone, and a great dryness and indifference if I think to do it as the
Church commands.”
1. El más insigniﬁcante suceso, 0.375
The most insigniﬁcant occurrence
el encuentro de cualquier frase, 0.5
any sentence I encounter,
la palabra más inocente que oiga, 0.25
the most innocent word I hear,
lo que dice mi hijo, 0.625*
whatever my son says,
2. todo se me antoja aviso y símbolo 0.125
everything seems to me a signal, a symbol
y cosa de sentido oculto, 0.813*
and a matter of hidden meaning,
3. todo lo traduzco a mi estado. 1.0*
I translate everything to my state.
4. Si sigo así voy á caer en superstición. 1.0*
If I continue like this I will fall into superstition.
5. No suenan una vez las campanas 0.063
Not a single bell tolls
que no crea que me llaman; 0.934*
that I fail to believe is calling me;
6. se me antoja que se me ha de dirigir á preguntarme
que me pasa
0.125
I fancy that every man of the cloth that I pass
cualquier religioso que veo. 1.0*
will approach to inquire what is the matter with me.
7. Un deseo grande de declarar mi estado á todos, 0.688*
A great desire to declare my state to all,
8. una gran felicidad de hacer confesiones a cualquiera, 1.0*
a great happiness to make confessions to anyone,
9. y una enorme sequedad é indiferencia 0.125
and a great dryness and indifference
si pienso en hacerla como la Iglesia manda. 1.0*
if I think to do it as the Church commands.
The attribution of mental categories to the nine segments of
this phenomenological text was accomplished in the following
way. The students were instructed to attribute one or several of
the following terms to each segment: sensation, perception, emo-
tion, thought, image, recall, and intention. These seven mental
process categories were chosen as general classes usually employed
in general psychology textbooks, and do not attempt to capture the
range of human experience but to include broad-spectrum terms
of common use that are encountered both in popular and profes-
sional terminology. Depending on whether they judged that the
text in the segment expressed one or more of these mental states
or categories, the students ﬁlled a protocol sheet that was used for
statistical analysis. The same seven mental categories were care-
fully deﬁned in accordance with cognitive psychology criteria in a
second experiment. The deﬁnitions employed have been offered
before (Díaz, 2007, pp. 515–526) but in this occasion I will only
present the results for the ﬁrst test, inwhich the studentswere given
only the words of these mental functions without a deﬁnition. I
decided to use only the ﬁrst results because the aim of this paper
is of a more theoretical and general nature. The complete results
will be presented in a more factual and experimental manuscript
in preparation. The results of the ﬁrst evaluation appear in
Table 1.
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Table 1 | Mental term (categories) attribution to a phenomenological
text (excerpt from the “Intimate Journal” of Unamuno).a
Segment n Mental categories
Se Pr Em Th Im Re In
1 10 0.50 0.60* 0.30 0.30 0.60* 0.70* 0.20
2 14 0.57 0.21 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.14 0.29
3 16 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.69* 0.00 0.00 0.31
4 16 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.81* 0.00 0.00 0.19
5 15 0.27 0.40 0.13 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
6 16 0.50 0.25 0.13 0.37 0.19 0.13 0.25
7 11 0.27 0.00 0.82* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72*
8 16 0.38 0.06 1.00* 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.90*
9 16 0.25 0.06 0.69* 0.82* 0.19 0.06 0.25
aThe segments identiﬁed by more than half the observers appear in the ﬁrst
column under the legend segment. The number of observers that identiﬁed and
interpreted the segment is depicted under the letter n in the second column.The
next seven columns stand for the words that identify particular mental operations
in the following way: Se, sensation; Pr, perception; Em, emotion; Th, thought;
Im, image; Re, recall; and In, intention. The numbers in the matrix represent
the recordings of the category divided by n, the number of observers so that 0
means that no evaluator made the attribution and 1.0 that all evaluators made
the attribution. Bold numbers are signiﬁcant at the level of p < 0.01 for both
high and low scores of the category (Bernoulli hypotheses over proportion test).
The asterisk (*) signals the signiﬁcantly high attribution of the category in the
segment.
The signiﬁcantly high attributions can be interpreted in the
sense that this particular mental category was estimated to be
present in the segment by this strict inter-observer agreement
method. These results indicate high agreement concerning men-
tal activities expressed in the text among this group of students.
Indeed, it appears that most of the numbers in Table 1 are sig-
niﬁcant both in the mental categories that were felt to be present
in the segment, and also in those that were absent. The signif-
icantly low attributions indicate that all the judges agreed that
those mental categories were not expressed in the segment and
the high frequency of zeroes means that no observer attributed
some mental categories to particular text segments. The opposite
case, in which all the observers identiﬁed a given mental category
to a segment is much scarcer, so that the corresponding num-
ber 1.0 appears only once in segment 8 where all the participants
attributed an emotion to the segment. In this segment the author
actually identiﬁes three particular emotions (happiness [felicidad],
dryness [sequedad], and indifference [indiferencia]). Very high lev-
els of agreement were found for the category intention for segment
8 (0.90) and thought in segments 4 (0.81) and 9 (0.82). In segment
8 the writer speaks about confessing to others, while the intention
was more clearly expressed in the previous segment, which also
evoked a high agreement for this mental category (0.70). Again,
in segment 9 the author uses the verb to think (pienso). Another
interesting result is the signiﬁcantly high attribution to several cat-
egories for single segments, so that about half of them had more
than one category (segments 1, 7–9). This result may indicate that
a single act or state of consciousness may be a composite of several
mental factors in action, one characteristic that has been called
the holistic or binding character of consciousness (Díaz, 1996,
1997).
The ﬁrst segment apparently expresses a perception, an image,
and a recollection. The author speaks abouthavingheard sentences
in the past and therefore the readers interpret that an actualmental
image occurs at the moment of writing because the present tense is
used in this memory monolog. It is also interesting that some seg-
ments did not receive any signiﬁcant attribution of mental content,
as if it was possible to express an introspective textwithout content.
This occurs in segments 2, 5, and 6 in which most evaluators failed
to notice that thinking was necessarily taking place. This particu-
lar result shows that undeﬁned mental categories, even if they are
given to students of psychology, are not enough to produce reliable
inter-observer agreements, beyond the very obvious ones thatwere
already pointed out. Actually in segment 5 the author expresses
a belief categorically with the verb creer, an evident expression
of thinking. As it occurs with untrained observers of behav-
ior, a carefully deﬁned list of behavioral categories is necessary
to increase the levels of inter-observer agreement in quantitative
ethology.
The present research instrument was shown to have an advan-
tage over a statistical method for examining the agreement of
a given population concerning the mental categories attributed
to consensual segments of a phenomenological text. Neverthe-
less, the gap between the writer’s consciousness and the text, and
also the gap between the text and the interpretation make for
a substantial lag that may be progressively bridged with further
reﬁnements of the method up to a certain point. It seems worth-
while to pursue this objective in order to render phenomenological
texts more suitable for establishing dynamic models of conscious
processes.
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY PERSPECTIVES
Taking introspective phenomenological reports seriously in cogni-
tive neuroscience and neurophenomenology research is a fascinat-
ing butmultiple, challenging, and taxing enterprise. It requires: (1)
the development of a theoretical and practical framework to deﬁne
and choose genuine phenomenological reports and texts, (2) a cog-
nitive framework to infer their production and structure in terms
of experience, (3) a linguistic method to infer consciousness states
and processes from their transcription or written expression, (4)
a modeling procedure to quantify, analyze and chart such states,
and ﬁnally (5) the design of research protocols to correlate the
resulting phenomenological items to neuroanatomical and neuro-
physiological recordings. The ultimate challenge, of course, would
be the understanding how and why such psychophysical corre-
lations come about and operate. Nevertheless we have seen that
subjective ﬁrst-person reports expressing conscious processes can
be treated so they progressively satisfy methodological cognitive
neuroscience and neurophenomenological requirements for rel-
evance, reliability, operational deﬁnitions, sampling procedures,
inter observer agreement, quantitative analyses, and formal mod-
eling of consciousness. Particularly, it seems that much is to be
learned from the application of narrative linguistic–literary anal-
yses and taxonomies to ﬁrst-person and subjective verbal and
written descriptions of the process and contents of conscious-
ness. Also, there is ample room for producing increasingly suitable
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phenomenological discourses and texts, verbatim renditions and
displays, encoding and transcription of indicative elements of such
descriptions into formal dynamic-system models. As frequently
occurs with novel scientiﬁc tools, such Narrative Method for Con-
sciousness Research (Name-core) would be initially descriptive
and correlative before it could be applied in answering questions
concerning the functions of consciousness from the viewpoint
of neurophenomenology and the cognitive neurosciences. The
method could become a useful tool not only in the understanding
of the structure (content and operations) of conscious states and
processes but in the analysis and comparison of authors, texts, or
evaluators. Moreover, it seems possible to envisage studies of the
neural correlates of the verbal and written productions of subjects
during the free or increasingly reﬁned expression of their mental
states within the stipulations of the autonomous monolog and the
narrative method. In order to specify conscious operations and
contents, and thereby being able to ﬁnd their neural correlates,
the narrative method would require the stipulation of mental
contents by a group of trained evaluators and the retrospective
selection of the corresponding periods during their recording by
electric or metabolic brain imaging procedures. The brain imag-
ing techniques applied in such a project would require particular
adaptations in order to bypass or properly comprise the language
production mechanisms that would be common to all conscious
states under study.
This article presents a methodology to track consciousness by
means of ﬁrst-person narrations and illustrates the approach by
appealing to phenomenological texts, i.e., ﬁction and non-ﬁction
literary works where vivid expressions of ﬁrst-person conscious
processes can be found. In order to decipher the streams of con-
sciousness that underlie these narrations, this communication
presents operational criteria for producing and selecting phe-
nomenological texts, develops an heterophenomenological system
for detecting conscious contents and processes in such texts, and
works out a procedure for representing such items in formal
dynamic system devices. Using two example texts, it shows that
mental states and processes can be reliably coded in stream-of-
consciousness narratives and can be modeled using Petri nets.
Finally the paper anticipates a neurophenomenology of con-
sciousness based on the combination of real time recording of
phenomenological vocal expressions produced by trained monolo-
gists during the acquisition of functional brain images. The
data provided by a post hoc transcription and detection of sig-
niﬁcantly recognized consciousness contents may be used as a
dependent variable of interest to correlate with brain imaging
neurophysiological variables.
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